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13 Summing Up: Reflections




Readers of this book old enough to remember the rapid increase in
the disability rolls in the 1970s and the political response and counter-
response that followed have now witnessed a complete disability pol-
icy cycle. Hence, in that sense, much of what has occurred in the first
years of the 1990s is not new. Further evidence of deja vu is provided
by the introduction of a now out-of-print book Disability and Work:
The Economics ofAmerican Policy Robert Haveman and I wrote in the
midst of the last great disability policy crisis brought on by rising dis-
ability rolls.
Political currents during the early 1980s have challenged the role
of the federal government in American society ... No set of pro-
grams offers a better microcosm of the political, moral, and eco-
nomic debates that will result from this general rethinking of the
role of social policy than those comprising the United States dis-
ability system ... Clearly, a strong moral commitment to provide
some form of protection and compensation to the disabled exists
in this country. However, increases in public spending on pro-
grams for the disabled and the network of regulations established
in an attempt to integrate fully the handicapped into society have
caused even the traditional supporters of government intervention
to pause. Concern with the rising costs of disability programs has
affected all recent administrations, irrespective of political party.
Any informed debate over the direction of United States disability
policy must take into account the complex nature of the existing
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system-its size, structure, recent growth, economic status, and
labor market effects. (Burkhauser and Haveman 1982, pp. 1-2).
It is a bit daunting to revisit work written over a decade and a half
ago. Having done so, I believe the general principles of disability pol-
icy analysis described there are as valid today as they were in 1982.
But in some important ways I was quite wrong about how disability
policy would evolve.
While Burkhauser and Haveman (1982) has a chapter on the rise of
policies to provide equal access to education, employment, and mobil-
ity, we did not expect accommodation to become as dominant a theme
as it is in current disability policy. We certainly did not foresee the
strength of the disability movement that helped pass the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, nor did we advocate as strongly as I
would now for the goal of full integration of people with disabilities
into the labor market. I was wrong about the future course of the debate
because in 1982 I believed that while it was possible that more people
with disabilities could work than were currently doing so, most people
with disabilities could not be integrated into the labor market.
As my discussion in Chapter 12 makes clear, I am now convinced
that not only are the majority of people able to work following the
onset of a disability but that they, in fact, are already doing so. Hence,
public policies that focus on encouraging work following the onset of a
disability are not based on daydreams or good wishes. (See Burkhauser
and Daly 1996a, 1996b.)
The following four propositions based on the research I have done
since Burkhauser and Haveman (1982) will reflect my perspective on
past and future disability policy and set the stage for the conclusions I
draw from the previous chapters.
1. Every person reading this book will die.
This proposition requires no additional evidence and, unfortunately,
will occur even if you don't tum another page.
2. Most of us will experience the onset ofa disability before we die,
and many ofus will do so while we are ofworking age.
Based on data from the Health and Retirement Survey, Burkhauser
and Daly (1996b) show that most people with disabilities aged 51 to 61
in 1992 experienced the onset of their disability during their work life.
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3. The most effective way to observe the importance ofdisability on
work and economic well-being is to track the labor earnings and
economic well-being ofpeople before and after onset ofa disabil-
ity.
Most comparisons of those with and without disabilities use cross-
sectional data. But simple comparisons of this nature can overstate the
importance of disability in explaining the difference between the two
groups. In Table 13.1, Burkhauser and Daly (1996b) use multiperiod
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynam,ics (PSID) to track the
work, labor earnings, and economic well-being of men and women fol-
lowing the onset of a disability. Our definition of disability is that the
respondent reports that a physical or nervous condition limits the type
of work or the amount of work he or she can do. Since this is multiyear
data, the respondent must report this for two consecutive years to be
counted as having a disability.
Using event history analysis and PSID waves of data for 1970 to
1989, we first find all persons between the ages of 25 to 61 who experi-
ence a disability and then look at what happens in the years prior to and
after this event. I As can be seen in Table 13.1 the median percentage
change in the labor earnings of men (women) from one year prior to
onset to one year after onset is a decline of 24 percent (41 percent); the
median decline two years after is 31 percent (62 percent). Clearly,
onset of a disability decreases labor earnings but does not end work,
and as Table 13.1 also shows, on average it is even less devastating to
the economic well-being of households.
We are able to look at the household size-adjusted income of people
with disabilities that comes from private sources by excluding all gov-
ernment taxes and transfers. This "counterfactual," which assumes
people would not change their behavior in the absence of taxes and
transfers, is a crude measure of what would have happened, but it does
provide an approximation of the importance of government in reducing
the shock of disability.
What we find belies the notion that the onset of a disability is on
average a devastating economic event. For men the median change in
before-government household size-adjusted income is a drop of 10 per-
cent. After two years the median change is a drop of 12 percent. For
women the median change is positive. Once government is taken into









working Median Before After working Median Before After
positive labor government government positive labor government government
Time point hours earningsa income income hours earningsa income income
Two years prior 90.4 21,215 17,347 16,224 67.3 5,063 18,247 16,842
One year prior 90.8 21,543 18,381 16,812 68.0 6,582 19,921 17,370
Year of disability event 87.2 18,760 16,434 16,160 70.0 5,995 19,827 17,923
One year after 72.3 13,220 14,567 15,739 63.6 3,277 18,446 17,859
Two years after 68.2 11,798 13,930 15,406 57.6 1,699 20,251 18,537
Median percentage
change from:
One year prior to one year
after disability na -24.0 -9.7 -2.6 na -41.0 1.7 5.0
One year prior to two years
after na -31.0 -12.1 -3.7 na -61.7 5.5 7.6
SOURCE: Burkhauser and Daly (l996b, Table 4, p. 71).
NOTE: The sample is based upon data from the 1970 to 1989 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The sample
includes household heads and spouses who report two consecutive periods of no disability followed by two consecutive periods of dis-
ability, who were between the ages of 25 and 61 at onset. A period of disability is one in which the respondent reports that a physical or
nervous conditiOn limits the type of work or the amount of work that he/she can do. Sample size for men in the first four periods is 725. It
is 677 in the fifth period (two years after). Sample size for women in the first four periods is 303. It is 236 in the fifth period (two years
after). The sample size is smaller for women because the PSID did not ask about spouses' disability status until 1981.
aMedian labor earnings includes zero earnings. Earnings are in 1991 dollars.
bBefore- and after-government incomes are adjusted for household size using the equivalence scale implied by the United States poverty
lines. Income-to-needs ratios can be computed by dividing equivalent median income by the 1991 one-person poverty threshold of
$6,932.
396 Burkhauser
account, the news is even better. After one year the median fall for men
is less than 3 percent and after two years less than 4 percent. Table 13.1
shows that our network of family and government does a reasonably
good job of protecting people from dramatic drops in economic well-
being following a disability. In making these assessments we do not
simply look at the replacement rates of a given program to evaluate the
change in economic well-being following the onset of a disability; we
look instead at the change in overall household income. And we key on
the transition into disability as the critical event, rather than the transi-
tion into a given program. While not perfect, on average our disability
system works to prevent serious economic losses to the households of
adults who experience the onset of a disability, at least in the short run.
Hence, if forced to label persons with disabilities as either heroes who
have coped with their disability and managed to offset its economic
consequences or as victims who have been overwhelmed by their dis-
ability and suffered dramatic economic loss, the stereotype I would
choose is hero.
4. Sophisticated social insurance and welfare networks were created
in western industrial countries to offset the economic effects ofa
disability, as well as other economic events (e.g., recessions,
depressions, plant closings, etc.) that threaten unemployment and
economic well-being.
Figure 13.1 puts disability-based insurance and disability-based
welfare programs in the context of overall social policy. In the next
sections I will use it as a means of putting the findings of the volume
into that same context. Figure 1 has its origins in Aarts, Burkhauser,
and de long (1996), which focuses on differences in social programs
across five western industrial countries-the United States, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, Germany, and Great Britain.
Figure 13.1 conceptualizes attempts by government policy to ame-
liorate job loss caused by economic or health factors in the context of a
series of paths that workers may take as they move from full-time work
to normal retirement. For workers who remain on the job over their
work life the path to retirement is a straightforward one. It is not until
they reach retirement age that they must choose between retirement
and continued work. But for a significant number of workers, job sepa-
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ration before retirement is a reality for which social welfare policy
must prepare.
No single figure can show all the possible paths that workers with a
disability may take over their lifetime, especially one that is intended
to show how labor market and social welfare institutions influence
those paths across countries. But it is possible to show in a broad way
how the incentive structure built into a country's institutions affect the
average person in that country. In general one can imagine four paths
that workers may take following the onset of such a disability. The
first, which is defined as the work path, encompasses public programs
that provide or encourage rehabilitation in order to overcome the work
limitations caused by a disability. But it also includes more direct gov-
ernment intervention into the labor market through the creation of spe-
cific government jobs for people with disabilities, subsidies to those
who employ such workers, job quotas, job protection legislation-dis-
missal rules, etc., or general antidiscrimination legislation requiring
accommodation for workers with disabilities. The intent of these poli-
cies is to maintain those with disabilities on the job and in the labor
market, either through the carrot of subsidies or the stick of mandates.
The second, which is defined as the disability insurance path,
encompasses traditional disability insurance-based transfer programs.
They may include short-term programs that mandate employers to pro-
vide replacement of lost wages during the first few weeks of sickness
or directly provide such replacement through short-term social insur-
ance. In all European countries, they would include the provision of
health care at no marginal expense to the worker. After some point,
workers are then eligible to move to a long-term disability insurance
program. Often acceptance into this program requires meeting both
health and employment criteria. This path eventually merges with
social security retirement programs.
The third, which is defined as the unemployment path, encompasses
the short-term provision of unemployment benefits that to replace lost
wage earnings due to cyclical economic downturns. At some point
longer-term unemployment insurance is made available, often at a
lower replacement rate. Finally, this also merges with the social secu-
rity retirement system at older ages. As we have seen, disentangling
exits from a job because of a disability and exits from a job because of
economic forces is in practice a difficult and often controversial task,
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especially since these exits can be influenced by the rules established
by a country's social welfare system.
The final path is defined as the welfare path. These means-tested
programs serve as a safety net for workers without jobs who are not eli-
gible for disability or unemployment-based social insurance programs.
Such programs can be universal, subject only to a means test and/or
linked to an inability to work either because of health, poor job skills,
or child-rearing responsibilities. This track can continue past retire-
ment age for those not eligible for social security retirement benefits.
The extremely simplified social welfare system pictured in Figure
13.1 provides some important insights for evaluating the disability
transfer system in any country. And it can be used to explain the impor-
tant empirical facts uncovered in Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) and Liver-
more, Stapleton, and Zeuschner (Chapter 8).
For persons who have a disability that begins to affect their ability to
work, important decisions about work often must be made. When mak-
ing those decisions in conjunction with an employer, the social institu-
tions of the country in which those persons work may also be
important influences. Such a worker is likely to look at the relative
rewards of continued movement along the work path versus entry onto
an alternative path. Similarly, a firm's willingness to accommodate
workers may also be influenced by the social institutions it faces.
Not all workers can or will transform themselves into candidates for
disability insurance benefits. But workers with a disability who are
having difficulty with their current job or who are no longer working
will be influenced by the relative rewards provided by the disability,
unemployment, and welfare paths in their country when deciding
whether to try to remain in the labor force or apply for transfer bene-
fits. Nor do all those with disabilities have the ability to continue to
work. Some people's disabilities are so severe that continued employ-
ment is impossible and a movement onto the transfer rolls is inevitable.
But for some portion of the population who suffer the onset of a dis-
ability that affects their ability to work, the length of time they con-
tinue on the job depends on the social institutions that are in place as
well as their specific health problems. These workers add to the supply
of candidates to disability transfer programs.
Countries with low or nonexistent welfare benefits, low unemploy-
ment benefits, and little available rehabilitation and job protection are
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likely to have a large supply of applicants for the disability insurance
path. This supply increases as the replacement rate increases and the
period of time over which benefits can be received increases. Examples
of such countries are the United States and the Netherlands where
increases in applications for disability benefits put tremendous pres-
sure on disability-based programs in times of serious economic down-
turns. Alternatively, when the protection offered by the unemployment
path is similar to that offered in the disability insurance path, as in Ger-
many, the supply of disability applicants does not increase significantly
during economic downturns.
In Sweden, where disability benefits are as generous as in the Neth-
erlands, application pressure on disability programs is far less severe
because all persons with a serious disability who seek disability trans-
fer benefits are first required to receive rehabilitation. Following reha-
bilitation, it is government policy to provide jobs in the public sector if
private sector jobs are unavailable. In Germany a combination of lower
replacement rates and a quota system and nonactuarially reduced early
retirement benefits deflect much of the pressure away from disability
transfer programs.
Figure 13.1 shows how the incentive structure inherent in a coun-
try's social welfare system influences the supply of disability candi-
dates. But it can also be used to describe the demand for such
candidates. To enter any of the four paths described in Figure 13.1, it is
necessary to satisfy entry requirements. In a social security retirement
insurance program, entry requirements are usually straightforward. A
worker must have worked in covered employment for a given time or
have performed other easily verified activities (e.g., attend school, rear
children) and must be a given age. Such eligibility criteria are easy to
administer. This makes the task of the front-line gatekeepers routine.
They simply follow relatively objective criteria with little room for
individual interpretation.
Of course, the overall size of the population on the retirement rolls
will change if a higher benefit is paid or the age of eligibility is low-
ered, but gatekeeper discretion will not enter into this change. They
will simply follow new criteria. Determining eligibility for the various
paths open to those who have a disability that begins to affect their
work but who are below early retirement age is not as clear-cut.
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Unlike age, which is relatively easy to verify, disability is a complex
concept that has both health- and work-related components. One easy
way to screen for benefits is to require a waiting period of around one
year between the onset of the condition and eligibility, and to record
how much the person is actually working. Then, either a private physi-
cian or a physician employed by the system determines the seriousness
of the health condition with respect to the person's ability to work.
While the first two pieces of evidence are easily measurable, the third
is less so. Doctors can evaluate health conditions as they relate to a
norm, but there is no unambiguous way to relate a health condition to
one's ability to work. Hence, disability program gatekeepers' discre-
tion in carrying out established criteria is much greater than it is for
retirement.
Access to the work path and the disability insurance path may be
closely coordinated, as in Sweden, where a centralized group of gate-
keepers determines who can be rehabilitated and who goes directly
onto disability transfer rolls. But these paths may also be administered
in quite independent ways. In the United States, rehabilitation services
are administered by an entirely different group of gatekeepers with lit-
tle or no coordination between them and the gatekeepers who adminis-
ter the disability transfer system.
All of these factors then enter into the way that front-line disability
gatekeepers respond to changes in' supply and to the voices of those at
higher levels of administrative responsibility who are attempting to
control the overall flow of people into the system. In periods of eco-
nomic downturn, the number of workers who leave their jobs rises and
applications to transfer programs increase. In countries like the United
States and the Netherlands, with generous disability benefits relative to
other alternatives, tremendous pressure is put on the disability system
to provide income to those workers. The pressure may lead to a spe-
cific easing of the rules or simply to a change in the interpretation of
the rules. In this way "demand" may shift to accommodate supply.
What Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) have documented is that the busi-
ness downturn of 1989-1991 had an important role in the upsurge in
disability applications, as Figure 13.1 would predict. But they also find
that entrance into the program is not inevitable. The major recession of
the early 1980s also had an important effect on applications but did not
result in additions to the rolls since the gatekeepers were signaled by
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Congress and the administration to resist. None of these ebbs and flows
in application and acceptance rates can be explained by changes in
underlying health conditions in the United States.
As Figure 13.1 suggests, countries with generous and easily accessi-
ble unemployment and welfare paths are not as likely to see the impact
of major business cycle shifts on applications to their disability insur-
ance path. But in the United States our unemployment system is not
particularly generous and is short term. And, unlike most European
countries, we have no universal income maintenance system. General
Assistance and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) are
the primary nonhealth-related sources of income for low-income peo-
ple. As the eligibility criteria are tightened and the length of stay made
more limited on these two programs, Figure 13.1 suggests that this will
lead to increased pressure on SSI as an alternative to these two pro-
grams. Bound, Kossoudji, and Ricart-Moes (Chapter 7) suggest that
this is exactly what happened in Michigan when their General Assis-
tance program was cut. Several other chapters on the topic of applica-
tion and growth (Stapleton et aI., Chapter 2; Livermore, Stapleton, and
Zeuschner, Chapter 8; and Bordelon's comments on Chapters 6-8)
show that at the gatekeeper level there is a movement from General
Assistance and to a lesser extent from AFDC onto the SSI rolls.
In addition to the supply story emphasized in Figure 13.1, there is
the "cost-shifting" issue that is a generic problem of our multilevel
approach to social welfare policy in the United States. An important
message of this book is that there has been a systematic effort by state
governments to shift their welfare costs to the federal government,
which explains part of the upsurge in Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) applications. (See especially Livermore, Stapleton, and
Zeuschner, Chapter 8.) The welfare reforms of 1996, which require
states to pay 100 percent of the marginal cost of AFDC clients will
make SSI an even more inviting program for state administrators anx-
ious to shift costs back to the federal government.
While Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner have concentrated on
the importance of policy changes in General Assistance and AFDC on
the SSI rolls, another policy change already adopted will also affect the
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and SSI rolls in the next
decade. To reduce the financial burden of the aging baby boom popula-
tion on the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance system, the normal age of
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retirement is scheduled to increase from 65 to 67 in the next century. It
is likely that further increases in both the early and normal retirement
age will come. But Figure 13.1 shows that as we make the paths to
retirement longer, the populations on DI and SSI will increase, because
duration on the program will increase as will the incidence of new
enrollment at older ages. This notion of the importance of duration on
the size of the disability rolls is addressed by Rupp and Scott
(Chapter 4) as well as by Muller and Wheeler (Chapter 6).
A final issue related to disability program growth discussed in this
book is the shift in impairment trends among applicants and awardees
over the last decade. Stapleton et al. (Chapter 2) document that appli-
cations and awards based on mental disorders and musculoskeletal
conditions have grown much more rapidly than applications and
awards based on other impairments. To paraphrase their arguments in
terms of Figure 13.1, they argue that this phenomenon is much more
related to changes in the actions of disability gatekeepers than in
underlying changes in conditions. Changes in the eligibility criteria
and the greater emphasis on functional criteria rather than on medical
evidence has led to more awards, not a change in underlying health
conditions.
GROWTH IN THE DISABILITY TRANSFER POPULATION: A
POLICY SUCCESS OR FAILURE
While Figure 13.1 is useful in providing a fuller policy context for
the rapid increase in the disability rolls documented in this book, it is
less useful in determining whether this increase was a policy success or
a failure.
While I am confident a consensus exists on the importance of eco-
nomic and policy factors on recent disability program growth, I am
much less confident consensus exists on the appropriateness of this
policy outcome. This lack of consensus is best captured by the compet-
ing views of Goldman and Weaver in Chapter 11. While Goldman sees
the growth in mental disorder awards as the expected consequence of a
society finally reaching out to an underserved population in need,
Weaver sees this as a substantial lowering of the gates with respect to
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our definition of disability. Likewise, the tremendous outreach
"achievements" discussed by Livermore, Stapleton, and Zeuschner
(Chapter 8) and Bordelon (comments on Chapters 6-8) can either be
seen as an appropriate attempt to provide deserved disability benefits to
people unaware of their rights or as further evidence of a concentrated
effort to shift the burden of general welfare assistance from the state to
the federal government.
Ultimately, policy outcomes of the 1990s will be judged by one's
overall view of the goals of social policy, and of disability insurance
and welfare programs within it. It is at this point that I must confess
that as a "poverty policy expert" of the 1970s, I and many of my col-
leagues advocated and laid the groundwork for the system we have
today.
I was among the majority of academics who supported a Negative
Income Tax in the 1970s. In fact, it was then common in policy circles
to whisper that the passage of Supplemental Security Income effec-
tively gave us a Negative Income Tax (NIT) not only for all older peo-
ple but, with a broad enough definition of disability, most younger
people as well. Today many policy experts and most advocates for the
poor see the expansion of SSI as the best practical method of insuring a
universal federal government-financed minimum income floor under
all Americans.
Many things have changed about me in the last twenty years: first,
the length of my hair, which was the defining characteristic of my gen-
eration, is shorter and has turned from brown to grey. Second, my faith
in the NIT as the basis for assisting poor people has been critically
affected by the very mixed results of thirty years of war on poverty pro-
grams. I now more fully recognize the dangers to the human spirit that
permanent transfers bring. I am no longer a supporter of an NIT or any
other universal guaranteed transfer program that requires no quid pro
quo of its beneficiaries. I do not believe that residency or even citizen-
ship confers an entitlement to a minimum benefit, and I believe it is
neither in the beneficiaries' interest nor in the interest of taxpayers to
provide such benefits. Third, and more to the point, I am not alone. I
doubt if even in the 1970s a majority of Americans supported universal
guaranteed welfare minimums. Otherwise, then why did we have to
hide the universal minimum in the guise of a disability program? But
today the political mood is much less supportive of federally imposed
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minimums. The passage of welfare reform legislation that ended the
open-ended guarantee of support payments for AFDC recipients by a
Republican dominated Congress and signed by a Democratic president
just before the presidential elections of 1996 is evidence of the political
consequences of this mood. To the degree that SSI is seen as a mecha-
nism for supporting those who could work, its survival is also threat-
ened. This is the real danger that people with disabilities should
recognize in their support of current DI and SSI eligibility criteria.
Fourth, what I believe is more in keeping with traditional American
values and what a majority of Americans will support are government
programs that subsidize work, not welfare, or, to borrow a phrase from
a current political leader-programs that make work pay. As general
transfer programs like General Assistance and AFDC are cut in an
effort to shift people into the workforce, there will be increasing efforts
to place these former beneficiaries on SSI as their benefits expire. Daly
(Chapter 5) shows that this is already occurring, and the 1996 welfare
reform legislation guarantees it will increase.
Finally, let me suggest why the defenders of our current system of
transfer payments should pause. It is often said by veteran activists that
while SSI is not a very generous program, at least it provides a safe
haven against the uncertainty of the work path. And advocates of peo-
ple with disabilities have labored tirelessly in Congress and in the
courts to ensure that most people on SSI will never have to leave that
program. But there is evidence that the uncertainty of the work path
may in the long run be preferable to what appears to be the safety of
SSI and other welfare-based transfer programs.
In a series of papers (Burkhauser et al. 1996a, 1996b~ Burkhauser,
Crews, and Daly 1997) look at how income distribution in the United
States changed over the 1980s and early 1990s. We then look at how
subpopulations within these countries fared over this period. 2
Figure 13.2 shows the distribution of real pretax, postransfer individ-
ual household size-adjusted income in the United States in 1979, 1982,
and 1989. Since much of the discussion in this book has centered around
the importance of business cycles, it is important to recognize that 1979
and 1989 are peak years in the business cycle of the 1980s while 1982
is the trough year in that business cycle. Hence, one can see the powerful
negative effect the recession of the early 1980s had on the economic
well-being of the entire population, as it shifted the entire distribution to
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the left from 1979 to 1982. Over the next seven years, however, eco-
nomic growth shifted the entire distribution back to the right.
Much of the discussion of the 1980s ignores the importance of gen-
eral economic conditions on income distribution and simply compares
income distributions between two arbitrary years. Figure 13.2 shows
that the years chosen can greatly influence one's view of that decade.
But in looking at the 1980s it is most appropriate to choose points at
the same place in the business cycle. Figure 13.3, compares the two
peak years-1979 and 1989.3 It confirms conventional wisdom that
inequality increased and the mass of people in the middle of the distri-
bution fell. Note the shaded area. This is the "vanishing middle class."
Some of the mass fell to the left-the mass of people at the bottom of
the distribution grew. But the important news is that the vast major-
ity-90 percent-of the mass in the middle shifted to the right. That is,
the majority of the "disappearing middle class" became better off
rather than worse off. Inequality grew, but it did so because people in
the middle became better off at different rates.4
We then divided the population into three broad subsets: persons liv-
ing in younger households (all persons living in a household headed by
an individual aged 61 or younger, in which some household labor earn-
ings but no social assistance benefits are reported; persons living in
older households (all persons living in a household whose head was
aged 62 and older); and persons living in younger social assistance
households (persons living in a household whose head was aged 61 or
younger in which some form of social assistance-SSI, AFDC or other
welfare transfers-was received). When we do this for young working
households the distribution mirrors Figure 13.3. Inequality grew, and
the middle mass fell. While there was some small growth on the left,
the majority of people in these households became richer. For older
households the entire distribution moves to the right between 1979 and
1989. There was an unambiguous improvement in the economic well-
being of older people living in households in the 1980s, in large part
because of increases in social security retirement benefits and in the
prevalence and generosity of employer pensions over the period.
What I want to focus on is the third subgroup-persons living in
younger social assistance households. Figure 13.4 shows that the dis-
tribution of household size-adjusted income of this population shifted
to the left between 1979 and 1982. That is, like other Americans, those
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persons in social assistance households were worse off in the business
cycle trough year of 1982 than in the peak year of 1979. But unlike
other Americans, seven years of economic growth was not able to
return them to their previous 1979 high, let alone shift the distribution
to the right of its 1979 position. While on average, persons on social
welfare assistance were slightly better off in 1989 than in 1983, they
were less well-off than in 1979. The overall economic well-being of
those on welfare actually declined.
In the 1990s the bipartisan groups that are "reinventing government"
and "changing welfare as we know it" show precious little support for
increasing the economic well-being of nonworking welfare recipients.
Thus, for young people with disabilities who are on the verge of mov-
ing toward either the work or welfare paths, the future value of a life-
time of SSI benefits is quite uncertain. Perhaps it is time for the
advocates of people with disabilities to shift their efforts from the lost
cause of defending and enlarging support for programs that subsidize
nonwork to programs that encourage work.
In fact, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, with its empha-
sis on accommodation and the view that the majority of people with
disabilities can work, should be at the center of a set of policies that
begin to shift our collective energies from nonwork to work subsidies.
But this movement should recognize that with rights come responsibil-
ities. If people with disabilities are able to work, then our public poli-
cies should be built around this expectation and not around a
guaranteed lifetime of welfare transfers.
As I discussed in Chapter 12, accommodation, disabled worker tax
credits, rehabilitation, and training offer real alternatives for an impor-
tant segment of the population with disabilities who would otherwise
be in the next wave of SSI or DI beneficiaries.
This book has established that economic and policy forces signifi-
cantly affect the DI and SSI rolls. While we will always need SSI and
DI for some people with disabilities, for many others this is a poor sec-
ond-best alternative. It is time to stop using SSI as a back door route to
universal welfare minimums. Rather, we should recognize that people
with disabilities have more in common with other Americans than they
have differences. Economic growth is the primary engine of growing
economic well-being for most Americans, including those with disabil-
ities. People with disabilities who have good job skills are already able
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to integrate themselves into the American workforce; those with dis-
abilities and poor work skills, the doubly disadvantaged, do need a
hand up, but we should first try to improve their economic well-being
through work programs before we push them onto the welfare path.
Notes
1. Burkhauser and Daly (1996b) also provide cross-sectional information on the
labor force participation of people with and without dIsability. We find the maJor-
Ity of men and women aged 25 to 61 who report a disabihty in 1989 (using the
same two-period definition of disabihty) worked at least 52 hours in that year and
about 40 percent of men worked full-time. As was discussed in Stapleton et al
(Chapter 2), the business cycle plays a role in the work hves of people WIth dIsabil-
Ities. The year 1988 was the sixth straIght year of economIC growth m the United
States and hence reflects work outcomes near the peak of the 1980s business cycle.
Using the same definition of disability and work, Burkhauser and Wittenburg
(1996) look at labor force partIcipatIOn rates of people WIth disabilities between
October 1990 and January 1992 usmg the Survey ofIncome and Program PartIcI-
pants. Labor force participation of people With disablhties is lower during this
weaker economic period; yet, about one-half of men with disabihties worked.
2. The data used m these papers come from the Current Population Survey. As in
Table 13.1, the umt of analysis is the person, but withm a household context in
which it is assumed that household mcome IS equally shared using an equivalence
scale with an elastiCIty of 0.5. For the Umted States, household income is pre-tax
and post-transfer. In-kind transfers are not counted.
3. Burkhauser et al. (1996b) repeat thIS exercise usmg the trough-to-trough years
1982 and 1992. The results are SImilar to the peak-to-peak comparIsons. Both these
results are quite dIfferent from those one would find by companng a peak year-
1979-with a trough year-1992 (see, for instance, Danziger and Gottschalk
1995) Not surprisingly, compansons of peak-to-trough years lead to a much worse
outcome but one that mixes changes along a busmess cycle with changes across
busmess cycles. For a fuller discussion of the sensitiVIty of across-year compari-
sons of economIC well-being see Burkhauser, Crews, and Daly (1997).
4. The definition of middle class used here IS baSIcally a statistical one. It IS the mid-
dle of the 1979 dIstribution, which IS bounded by the upper and lower intersec-
tions of the 1989 distributIOn-the "mIddle mass" of the distribution. Of course,
these "mtersectIOn points" do not reflect the political concept of the middle class.
In 1989 dollars the lower mimmum IS $4,725 for a single person ($9,450 for a
household of four), or 74.9 percent of the poverty line and the maximum of
$30,615 for a smgle person ($61,230 for a household offour-48.5 times the pov-
erty line). Burkhauser, et al. (l996a) offer an alternative lower boundary of twice
the poverty line $12,622 for a single person ($25,244 for a household of four),
which more closely matches the lower boundary of the pohtical middle class, and
412 Burkhauser
reach the same conclusion-that the overwhelming majority of the mIddle class
became richer in the 1980s.
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